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FOREWORD 
This is one of a set of five final reports, each one describing the results of a task 
performed under Contract NAS 9-11189, "Au Engineering Study of Onboard 
Checkout Techniques." The five reports are as follows, all dated March 1971: 
Task I: REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND CONCEPTS (IBM NO. 
71W-001 11) 
Task 2: SOFTWARE (IBM NO. 71W-001 12) 
Task 3: ONBOARD MAINTENANCE (IBM NO. 71W-OW 13) 
Task 4: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS (IBM NO. 
7lW-00l14) 
Task 5: SUBSYSTEM LEVEL FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS 
(IBM NO. 71W-001 15) 
The nine-month study was performed by the IBM Federal Systems Division at its 
Space Systems facility in Huntsville, Alabama, with the support of the McDonnell 
Douglas Astronautics Company Western Division, Huntington Beach, California. 
Technical Monitor for the study was Mr. L. Marion Pringle, Jr., of the NASA 
Manned Spacecraft Center. The guidance and support given to the study by him and 
by other NASA personnel are gratefully acknowledged. 
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Section 1 
.
	 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the task reported in this document is to generate recommenda-
tions of supporting research and technology activities leading to implementation of 
a manned electronics maintenance facility for the Space Station. 
1.2 TASK APPROACH 
The task began with a review of the state of in-space maintenance technology, 
development of an approach to analyzing onboard maintenance requirements, and 
further definition of the key issues to be addressed. It soon became apparent that 
attention could not be confined to a central maintenance facility; it was necessary 
to refocus the task to address implementation of an onboard maintenance capability 
encompassing in-place as well as centralized maintenance activities. Because of 
budgetary and schedule limitations, it was necessary to continue to restrict the 
scope of the task to electronic equipment maintenance. The critical questions are 
the following. 
. What is the optimum allocation of onboard maintenance functions 
between in-place and centralized maintenance facility locations? 
• What is the optimum level of onboard repair (i. e., to line-replaceable 
unit, subassembly or module, piece part, or circuit element)? 
1.2. 1 MAINTENANCE CYCLE 
In order to place the task in the proper context, a generalized Space Station 
electronic maintenance cycle is depicted in Figure 1-1. 
A convenient place to enter the cycle is with detection of a fault ("In-Place 
Maintenance" block). The fault is isolated to a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The 
affected subsystem is restored to full capability by replacing the failed LRU with 
an operable one from spares storage. 
The failed LRU is taken to a maintenance facility (assumed for the moment 
to have a fixed location in the Space Station) where it is first classified as repair-
able or non-repairable. Classifications will likely be predetermined, and a listing 
should be retained in the Data Management Subsystem. If the LRU is non-repairable, 
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Figure 1-1. Space Station Maintenance Cycle 
1-2 
it is placed in segregated storage. If the LRU is repairable on board, the fault is 
further isolated to the failed Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRA). The LRUis then 
repaired by replacing the failed SRA with one from spares storage. The repaired 
.
	
	
LRU is then calibrated (if necessary), and its operation verified before it is placed 
in spares storage. 
Logistics requirements (replacement LRUs and SRAs needed) are transmitted 
to ground-based logistics support functions by RF communications and/or Space 
Shuttle. Failed units are taken away from and replacement units are delivered to 
the Space Station by the Space Shuttle. 
1. 2.2 STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The sequence of task activities actually followed in the study is depicted in 
Figure 1-2. Subtasks and activities are summarized below. Results are summarized 
in Section 2 and are detailed in subsequent sections. 
• Maintenance Technology Review consisted of accumulation, review, and 
evaluation of the results of prior work in the field in order to avoid 
duplication of previous effort. 
• Safety guidelines were adopted largely from previous work, primarily 
to assure that further analysis was appropriately constrained by safety 
considerations. 
is
	
	
• A Sparing Philosophy aimed at providing spares at the lowest practicable

assembly level, with maximum commonality, was adopted as a considera-
tion in maintenance requirements analysis. 
• Maintenance Requirements Analysis was the critical portion of the entire 
task. It consists of the following activities. 
-	 Establishment of a Data Base, consisting of information about 
three electronic subsystems, their LRUs and their SRAs, related 
to maintenance. These data are inputs to subsequent analyses. 
-	 Identification of Maintenance Techniques (Substitution, Direct 
Replacement, and Testing Fault Isolation) and their applicability 
to different maintenance approaches. 
- Analysis of Maintenance Incidents, or the frequency with which 
maintenance actions will be expected in each group of electronic 
equipment of interest.
1-3
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Figure 1-2. Task Activities
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- Analysis of average Crew Time requirements to support fault isola-

tion and maintenance for each maintenance concept of interest. 
.	
- Sparing Analysis consisted of estimating weight penalties associated 
with each maintenance concept. 
• Tools and Test Equipment applicable to a Space Station onboard main-
tenance capability were identified to a level consistent with the level of 
definition of the prime equipment as it is presently known. 
• Several candidate Supporting Research and Technology (SR&T) projects 
leading to implementation of an onboard electronic maintenance capability 
have been identified and summarized. 
• This Final Report was compiled from the technical results of the fore-
going activities. 
. 
.
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Section 2
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The study confirmed and emphasized the necessity of onboard maintenance 
for any manned mission of any complexity and duration measured in months (up to 
10 years for Space Station). Formulation of recommendations for implementing 
such a capability required consideration of other topics first, and achievement of 
certain interim results. The principal conclusions of this study task are sum-
marized in this section. The analyses leading to them are explained in subsequent 
sections. 
• Prior studies and developments of in-space maintenance have emphasized 
justification of first-level (in-place) maintenance, fasteners, and tools 
for space application and human factors criteria. Much less attention 
has been devoted to test equipment, maintenance training, or definition 
of shop level maintenance requirements. 
• The baseline subsystem descriptions, checkout requirements analysis, 
and software requirements analysis indicate that approximately 60 per-
cent of all faults (over a long period) can be isolated to the failed LRU 
automatically under software control, without crew intervention. In an 
additional 27 percent of failure cases, fault isolation to one LRU can be 
.	 achieved by the crew using the onboard Data Management System as a 
tool. In the remaining failure cases, additional fault isolation capabilities 
are needed. This is a good result for a "first iteration" and can probably 
be improved considerably with a modest effort to modify stimulus and 
measurement provisions. 
• Crew involvement in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance (including 
participation in fault isolation) is estimated to average 7. 2 manhours 
per week over the total mission time. This estimate is most sensitive 
to equipment reliability and levels at which onboard repair is performed. 
It is affected little by the efficiency of automated fault isolation under 
control of the Data Management Subsystem (DMS). 
• The recommended approach to maintenance in the baseline Space Station 
is in-place removal and replacement of LRUs, without attempts to repair 
LRUs onboard, if the resupply interval is less than nine months. On-
board spares should be LRUs. 
.
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• For long resupply intervals or non-resupplied missions (as in a manned 
interplanetary mission), in-place maintenance should be by removal and 
replacement of LRUs. Repair of LRUs should be by removal and replace-
ment of Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs). Onboard spares should be 
SRAs. 
• The Earth-orbital Space Station should include provision for development 
of onboard maintenance capability and techniques applicable to long dura-
tion non-resupplied missions and/or the larger, more complex Space 
Base. 
•	 The baseline subsystem descriptions are at such a level of detail that 
precise specification of onboard tools and test equipment is neither 
feasible nor desirable. Anticipated needs identified qualitatively in the 
study are: (1) a portable test module to supplement software fault isola-
tion as well as to assist mechanical adjustments and calibrator, (2) hand 
tools for removal and replacement of electronic assemblies, (3) devices 
for transporting and positioning spare assemblies, and (4) a central 
maintenance /repair bench. 
• Several tasks have been identified and recommended for future performance, 
as part of a system study/design program or as separate supporting research 
and technology tasks. The principal ones deal with (1) development of a 
portable test assembly, (2) development of a repair/test bench with 
special provisions for small parts retention and for debris collection, 
(3) design for accessibility of test points and subassemblies, and (4) 
devices for transporting equipment within the Space Station. 
The foregoing conclusions apply to the Modular Space Station as well as the 33-foot 
diameter, four-deck configuration. 
The results of the study rest upon several assumptions and estimates, derived 
wherever possible from related experience. The results are not sensitive to small 
variations of the assumed or estimated values, except for equipment failure rates, 
which are most influential. Furthermore, it has not been practicable to pursue 
all trade analyses to include all relevant factors. Nevertheless, the study has 
generated valid insights into Space Station onboard maintenance and useful visibility 
of the path to implementation of that capability.
. 
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Section 3 
.
	 MAINTENANCE TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
3.1 CONCLUSIONS 
The Maintenance Technology Review included review and evaluation of 32 
documents which from title and abstract appeared to address the topic of this study. 
Prior work has emphasized the following factors: 
.	 Justification for first-level maintenance in flight 
• Development and testing of fasteners and tools for use in the 
space environment 
• Development of applicable human factors criteria 
Little work has been done in 
• Defining test equipment requirements 
• Establishing maintenance training requirements 
-
	
	 • Defining requirements for shop level maintenance 
3.2 MAINTENANCE TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
Subsection 3. 6 lists the documents studied to determine the status of develop-
ment of in-flight maintenance concepts, tools, and test equipment. Information 
contained in the reports is divisible into four categories: 
1. In-flight maintenance concepts 
2. Tool and fastener design 
3. Test equipment design 
4. Human factors, documentation, and training requirements 
.
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Category 1 information was useful in formulating a sparing philosophy and 
defining safety guideline elements. Tool and fastener design criteria found in the 
category 2 reports are summarized. Category 3 information was negligible. 
Category 4 information is also summarized in the following subsection. This in-
formation provides guidelines and constraints useful to the overall maintenance 
facility concept. 
3.3 IN-FLIGHT MAINTENANCE 
Equipment to be maintained in space must be designed with maintainability 
in mind. At least two documents exist that will be of assistance to the equipment 
designer in this regard. The first and most recent is Appendix B pf Reference (11) 
which is dated June 1970. The title is "Maintainability Design Criteria for 
Packaging of Space Replaceable Electronic Equipment." It is recommended that 
this document become a NASA standard and that it be made a contractual docu-
ment in all Space Station hardware procurements where it is applicable. The 
second document is Reference (7) which was published in 1961. A portion of one 
of the tables in this document has been extracted, updated to the Space Station 
application, and included herewith as Table 3-1. 
In-flight maintenance concepts appearing in the literature are oriented 
predominantly to in-place maintenance. Material applicable to a central Main-
tenance Facility is lacking, although some authors recognized other than first-
level maintenance as a possibility (3, 21, 13). * 
3.4 TOOL AND FASTENER DESIGN 
Tool and fastener design data in the available literature are oriented to 
in-place removal and replacement. In general, existing tools are considered 
adequate and usable in the space environment. The major change recommended 
is increasing handles' sizes for EVA. Significant recommendations for fasteners 
and associated tools were made by three authors (11, 16, 19). Although the same 
conclusion was not reached as to the type of fastener recommended, the need for 
standardization of fasteners and their tools is widely recognized. Chapter 7, 
Appendix B, of reference (11), gives a good summary of the maintainability re-
quirements for fasteners. Tool-operated fasteners should accept one of two 
standard sizes of internal wrenching hex drive. Reference (16) recommended no 
end loading type fasteners. Preference was given to a high torque fastener and 
tool made by Hi-Shear Corporation. Tests showed that the internal wrenching hex 
head fastener was subject to tool slippage with axial misalignment unless the socket 
is sufficiently deep. There is also a tendency to fumble when attempts were made 
to insert the tool if not perfectly aligned. This fault can be overcome by rounding 
*Numbers in parentheses refer to items in Subsection 3. 6.
. 
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Table 3-.1. Maintainability Criteria for Space Station Crew Safety 
.
Equipment/ 
Attributes	 Line Maintenance 
Accessibility	 Modules must be designed 
for quick easy removal 
and replacement. 
LRU must be designed 
such that replacement 
does not require removal 
or disconnection of 
another module.
Shop Maintenance 
Access to signal input 
and output points must 
allow for repair of 
modules or replacement 
of SRAs without major 
disassembly or removal 
of other components. 
Internal access must 
be considered from 
the bench check position 
of module. 
SRAs should not be 
placed so that the 
Astro-technician has 
to rely on feel. 
Coding and	 Replacement LRUs must	 All SRAs and their 
Labeling	 be labeled, preferably	 positions must be 
.
	 on face of the LRU.	 identified. 
Connectors	 Must be reliable and	 Crimp type connector 
capable of quick	 pins should be used to 
disconnect.	 facilitate maintenance. 
Equipment should be 
shut down during 
maintenance to prevent 
arcing of connectors. 
Unique keys should be 
provided for a group of 
LRUs. 
0-
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Table 3-1. Maintainability Criteria for Space Station Crew Safety (Continued) 
Equipment/ 
Attributes	 Line Maintenance	 Shop Maintenance 
Controls	 If adjustments are	 Internal controls to 
provided, they should be	 be adjusted should be 
placed on the face of 	 accessible without 
the LRU with positive 	 SRA disturbance. 
covers to prevent 
accidental disturbing. 
Displays	 Should indicate mal- 	 Not applicable at 
function to the LRU
	 this level of 
level,	 maintenance. 
Fasteners	 Must be quick and
	 Must be positive 
positive,	 and unaffected by 
handling. 
Size	 LRUs should be sized Provisions must be 
so they can be easily made so that both 
translated from place LRUs and SilAs can 
to place thru openings be handled. 
and ports by a single 
astronaut. Handles should allow 
the module to be 
moved conveniently. 
Shape	 Shape of LRUs must be SRAs must be of 
designed for ease of materials and shapes 
human handling in which can be handled. 
space. If not, special handling 
techniques or tools 
must be provided. 
Standardization	 LRUs must be sufficiently	 Standard symbols 
uniform for direct inter-
	 should be used for 
changeability without
	 identification of SRAs. 
adjustment. 
LRUs should be func- Standard and logical 
tionally complete and signal flow and 
functionally independent circuit groupings 
of other LRUs. should be used in 
design of modules.
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Table 3-1. Maintainability Criteria for Space Station Crew Safety (Continued) 
Equipment/ 
Attributes	 Line Maintenance	 Shop Maintenance 
Test Equipment	 Should indicate malfunction	 General Test equipment 
to the LRU level. 	 is most useful at this 
level. 
Reliability should exceed	 Regular routine checks 
equipment reliability by a 	 of equipment accuracies 
factor of ten.	 are required. 
Self-check features are 
required at this level of 
maintenance. 
Design of special test 
equipment must conform 
to Human Engineering 
requirements. 
Malfunction indications 
must be unambiguous. 
• Each test function should 
indicate the module being 
tested. 
Test Points	 Test points, if needed, 
should be on the face of 
panels and in accordance 
with Human Engineering 
principles for location, 
spacing, identification, etc.
Final testing of LRUs 
must be dynamic and 
include capability to 
check anticipated sys-
tem marginal 
conditions. 
Must be provided for 
signal input and output 
by SRA. 
Must conform to Human 
Engineering require-
ments for location, 
spacing, etc. 
Indications must be 
compatible with 
maintenance 
documentation. 
r
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Table 3-1. Maintainability Criteria for Space Station Crew Safety (Continued) 
Equipment/ 
Attributes	 Line Maintenance 
Tools No tool requirements other 
than adjustment or remove 
and replace. 
Fasteners which require 
tools should be avoided if 
possible. 
Mass	 The mass* of the LRU must 
be within the ability of the 
astronaut to handle.
Shop Maintenance 
General bench tools 
usually adequate. 
(Same as line 
maintenance.)
. 
*60...70 earth pounds (R & M Trade-offs Tillotson (F) p. 4).
. 
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the tip of the tool so it can be inserted into the socket and then rotated until it slides 
into place. This author recommended the fluted or splined internal wrenching drive 
over the hex drive. It should again be emphasized that whichever fastener is 
selected for Space Station application should be used consistently throughout the 
Space Station with not more than two tool sizes. 
Reference (19) included in the space tool kit such tools as screwdrivers, 
crescent wrenches, socket set, open-end wrench, and alien wrench sets. These 
could be reduced in number or eliminated by establishing a standard (two-size) 
internal wrenching fastener and tool combination for universal application through-
out the Space Station. 
3.5 HUMAN FACTORS - DOCUMENTATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
Several authors discussed human factors requirements, the most significant 
discussion being in document (11) which referenced in turn MSFC-STD-267A, 
Standard Human Engineering Design Criteria, revised in 1966. The other signi-
ficant work in this area was reported in reference (25). Pertinent comments were: 
• Keep clearances to walls and equipment to minimum distance to provide 
traction surfaces. 
•	 Light, short duration tasks can be performed while free floating. 
•	 Tasks requiring two hands or sustained force require restraints (foot). 
•	 Seated in a chair with seat belt restraint, intricate assembly tasks can 
be performed. 
Documentation requirements were also mentioned although briefly in most 
instances. The portable Astronaut's Test Kit (19) included a microfilm viewer and 
recommended that research be done to find or develop a flight qualifiable model. 
Reference (25) suggests that task procedures be thoroughly developed and rehearsed 
and that time lines be developed through task simulation. Reference (15) indicates 
that it is an advantage to prepare information in detail in the form of specially 
produced system diagrams, supported by monitoring, checkout, and setting up 
procedures in schedule form. The volume of maintenance data can be reduced by 
the following means: 
•	 Tailor to needs of user. 
•	 Emphasize brevity. 
•	 Orient toward level of repairability.
.
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Few of the sources reviewed mentioned training. One source was of the opinion 
that training was only necessary to implement the spares that were selected and 
carried onboard the Space Station. 
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MAINTENANCE SAFETY GUIDELINES 
Design of all space-maintainable equipment must embody features for the 
protection of both personnel and equipment from electrical, mechanical, and 
thermal hazards. If an astronaut must divert his attention from his maintenance 
task in order to observe safety precautions, the remainder of his attention might 
be inadequate for doing his job well. If hazards cannot be completely designed 
out of space systems, it is imperative that those remaining be clearly recognized 
and that provisions be made to protect both the astronaut and the equipment 
against them. (11) 
Most of the references reviewed addressed safety in general terms or in 
terms of the first level of maintenance. The most recent work in this area was 
done by Grumman Aerospace Engineering Company for MSFC (1 . Chapter 8 of 
Appendix B of this document adequately addresses safety during the first level of 
maintenance (Remove and Replace). Many of the guidelines for first level main-
tenance are also applicable to the second (Maintenance Facility) level of mainte-
nance. The following discussion reiterates the discussion in the above referenced 
document where it is applicable to the Maintenance Facility, with added comments. 
.
	 4.1 MECHANICAL HAZARDS 
4.1.1 EDGES AND SURFACES 
To minimize the possibility of physical injury, all edges and corners should 
be rounded to maximum practical radii. Thin edges should be avoided and con-
struction should be such that the item can be handled without danger of cutting the 
space suit or the astronaut's hands. All exposed surfaces should be smooth, 
covered, or coated to prevent the possibility of abrasion. Small projections, 
especially in areas where rapid movement can cause injury, should not be left 
uncovered. 
4.1.2 ROTATING DEVICES 
The Maintenance Facility is being considered for electronic maintenance 
only, so this topic is not directly applicable. 
.
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4.1.3 EXPLOSION 
Equipment that may be operated, maintained, or stored in an explosive 
atmosphere should be designed so as to eliminate the possibility of an explosion. 
All electrical equipment that will be used in the vicinity of flammable gases or 
vapors must be explosion-proof. Danger to personnel from an explosion should be 
avoided by separation of hazardous substances from heat sources and by incor-
poration of spark arrestors, suitable vents and drains, and other fire prevention 
measures. 
An oxygen-enriched atmosphere presents another hazard to manned space-
craft. Maintenance disconnects, particularly electrical connectors, must be 
designed to prevent ignition of combustible materials in concentrated oxygen. 
The use of zero-g type connectors which break electrical leads in a confined 
cavity are not recommended in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere as the only means 
of preventing explosion and flash fire. The atmosphere in the Maintenance Facility 
must be controlled to the extent that it does not present a hazard. Second-level 
maintenance could involve probing with the lead of a meter or scope; thus, the 
potential for an arc is very real. 
4.1.4 IMPLOSION 
Direct view storage tubes and cathode-ray-tubes are special hazards in that 
physical damage can result from implosion of these devices. These tubes are 
replaceable at both the SRA and LRU levels. The hazard can be minimized by 
enclosing the tube and all its yokes, deflection coils, etc. within an implosion 
proof metallic container with a shatter-proof glass front. This metallic container 
would be the lowest level of replacement. 
4. 1. 5 TETHER PROVISIONS 
To prevent equipment from floating away under zero-g conditions, provisions 
must be made to tether the equipment being removed and the equipment to be 
installed. The tethering devices must: 
•	 Be quickly applied (by using spring loaded snap fittings, for example) 
•	 Be standardized throughout the spacecraft 
o Be easily operable in both shirtsleeve and pressure suit environment 
•	 Be designed to minimize interference with the astronaut's 
maintenance performance
S 
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4.2 ELECTRICAL HAZARDS 
4.2. 1 ELECTRIC SHOCK 
The danger to personnel from electric shock must be eliminated by providing 
suitable safety interlocks and grounding enclosures or other protective devices plus 
a method of de-energizing power prior to making or breaking a connection. During 
IVA maintenance activity, some contact with electric potentials can be expected 
where personnel are, by the very nature of their maintenance duties, exposed to 
live terminals. Both shocks and burns, however, can be eliminated by exercising 
care in design and by a thorough understanding of electrical power characteristics. 
4.2.2 PREVENTION OF ELECTRIC SHOCK 
Provisions must be made to protect both personnel and equipment during 
manual fault isolation to the SRA level. Power down procedures before remove-
and-replace action should eliminate shock hazards during this operation. Typical 
ways of providing shock protection are listed below. The methods selected will 
depend on the voltages involved, the type of mounting, and the electrical interface 
used:
• Design so exposed voltage terminals are not located in the vicinity 
of test points 
S	 • Protective plastic covers over exposed potentially hazardous voltages 
• Eliminate probing as a troubleshooting technique 
4.2.3 ARCING 
Recommendations for "dead facing" and "down powering," if followed, will 
eliminate the arcing problem during first-level maintenance and hook up of LRU in 
the maintenance facility. Down powering should become a standard procedural 
step before the SRA is removed and replaced. To prevent arcs during trouble-
shooting procedures, probing must be eliminated as a troubleshooting technique. 
This imposes the requirement on design to provide adequate test points in a test 
connector that can be wired into appropriate test equipment. 
4.3 SAFETY MARKINGS 
Markings should be provided to warn personnel of hazardous conditions and 
precautions to be observed to ensure safety of personnel and equipment.
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Warning signs marked "CAUTION-HIGH VOLTAGE" or "CAUTION-HIGH 
VOLTS" should be placed in prominent positions on safety covers, access doors, 
and inside equipment wherever danger might be encountered. These signs should 
be durable, easily read, and placed so that dust or other foreign matter will not, 
in time, obscure the warnings. Because signs are not physical barriers, they 
should be relied on only if no other method of protection is feasible. 
The predominant color of equipment designed for safety, protective, or 
emergency purposes should be Insignia Red, Color No. 11136 of RED STD 595. 
4.4 THERMAL HAZARD 
Shields and guards must be used to prevent personnel from accidentally 
contacting items that are either hot or cold enough to cause personnel injury. 
Gloves or other protective clothing must be worn when it is necessary to perform 
maintenance in close proximity to hot or cold equipment such as Life Support 
water storage tanks during sterilization processes or cryogenic tanks, lines, and 
fittings. This should not beaproblem in the Maintenance Facility.
. 
. 
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Section 5 
SPARES. PROVISIONING PHILOSOPHY 
5.1 GENERAL 
Adequate spares must be carried onboard the Space Station to assure that 
crew safety and mission success are not endangered for lack of a spare. On the 
other hand there are weight and volume constraints that must be considered. 
Providing all the spares that appear to be required may incur severe payload 
penalties. A desirable future task is to select or generate a computer program 
that will determine adequate spare quantities based on all the limiting parameters, 
such as, cost, weight, volume, resupply interval and maintenance level. 
Another important factor is commonality. The number of different types 
of modules, whether at the LRU level or SEA level, should be minimized. Prior 
experience in space equipment design has indicated a tendency to sacrifice 
commonality in favor of other design parameters. One author identified some of 
the possibilities of designing common modules which are interchangeable. An 
excerpt from this article (31) follows as Subsection 5.2. 
Criticality of the subsystem or portion of the subsystem will have a direct 
bearing on the criticality of the spare line replaceable units (LRU). Ordinarily 
it will be desirable to restore the failed subsystem as quickly as possible so the 
repair action will take place by removing the failed LRU from the subsystem and 
replacing it with a spare LRU from serviceable storage. Some disposition is then 
made of the failed LRU. It is conceivable that some subsystem element might be 
of sufficiently low criticality or duty cycle that it will be more desirable to spare 
only at the shop replaceable assembly (SEA) level. In this situation the faulty 
LRU would be removed from the subsystem and taken to the Maintenance Facility 
where it would be repaired by removing and replacing the faulty SEA. The now 
refurbished LRU is then placed in the subsystem to restore it to service. At the 
other extreme is the subsystem that is so critical that the failurecan hardly be 
tolerated. In this situation, switchable redundancy will be used. If very critical, 
the circuitry should be designed for automatic switching with an appropriate signal 
to the control and display function that the switching had occurred. Then a normal 
remove-and-replace action would ensue to restore the subsystem's redundancy at 
the earliest convenient moment.
.
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Sparing at the SRA level is desirable for the following reasons: 
• Reduce the number of complex LRU5 that are required on board, thus 
reducing weight and required storage volume.	
. 
• Decrease the level of diagnostic resolution required. There would be 
a trade-off here between instrumenting for automatic fault isolation 
on-line, and providing off-line (Maintenance Facility) fault isolation 
capability. (i. e., the LRU would be a more complex, larger unit 
due to earlier termination of automatic fault isolation.). The 
subsystem could be restored to service by replacing this large 
block of circuitry; then the LRU would be tested and repaired in 
'the Maintenance Facility when more time was available. 
5.2 INTERCHANGEABILITY* 
5.2.1 POTENTIAL 
Items which have interchangeability potential are numerous and are limited 
only by the spacecraft designers' imagination and resourcefulness. The following 
is a partial list of candidates:
• Relays • Lighting 
• Switches • Blowers 
• Logic Modules • Pumps 
• Memory Units • Motors 
• Power Supplies • Heat Exchangers 
• Oscillators • Check Valves 
• Discriminators • Shut-off Valves 
• Amplifiers • Heaters 
• Buffers • Thrusters 
• Instruments • Water Separators 
* Reference 31, Subsection 3. 6
. 
S 
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5.2.2 MODULARIZATION 
•
	
	
Interchangeability need not be restricted to an equipment level. For instance, 
solenoid-actuated mechanisms may be designed to use a common solenoid. In this 
case, the solenoid could become the replaceable part level instead of the solenoid-
operated device. Modularization should be utilized to the maximum extent possible. 
There may be motor applications where each application requires a different size 
motor. Using the modular approach, it may be possible to use one motor for an 
application, or two or more motors in tandem, where more power is required. 
Heat exchangers can sometimes be modularized. Two small ones might 
be operated together to provide the function of one large one. Many instruments on 
a panel contain the same basic mechanism, differing only in their dial faces and 
range markings. Separating the mechanism from the dial face provides for an 
interchangeable instrument module. 
Many logic modules differ from one another only in one or a few of the many 
components installed in the module. Interchangeability can be achieved by providing 
for replacement of the differences, providing extra components so that modules can 
work in many applications, or by packaging so that the differences form a separate 
module, thereby maximizing the interchangeability of a large percentage of the 
components of the module. 
S
5.2.3 LEVEL OF MAINTENANCE 
The designer should not limit his thinking to any specific level of inter-
changeability. The level of maintenance selected for in-flight maintenance must 
be kept flexible-dependent only on the fault isolation capability, the ability of the 
crew to perform the maintenance task, and the extent of repeatability of the parts 
required to perform the task. The level of maintenance can be at the assembly 
level, the subassembly level, or the piece part level. Selection of the level of 
maintenance must be made on an individual basis; no one level fits all situations. 
.
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MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
6.1 DATABASE 
A matrix form was developed for conducting a maintenance requirements 
analysis (MRA) and to accumulate pertinent data for the Data Management; RIP 
Communications; and Guidance, Navigation, and Control Subsystems. 'Available 
Space Station Phase B design data are not in sufficient depth to directly provide 
all of 'the data needed to complete the matrix. In some instances (especially with 
respect to listing SRAs), it was necessary to make assumptions and estimates 
based on related experienëe and reasonable extrapolations of technological growth. 
The results of'this data-tabulation activity appear in Appendix A. This information 
was used in subsequent analyses. 
6.2 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS 
6.2.1 MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY 
The primary purposes of the Maintenance Facility task were to provide a 
definition of a maintenance capability for the Space Station and to consider the 
maintenance capability requirement unique to long duration, non-resupplied mis-
sions. The objective of the study is therefore described as the definition of an 
onboard maintenance capability as distinguished from the definition of a centralized 
Maintenance Facility. Maintenance capability includes tools, test equipment, 
accessories required for holding and maneuvering spare assemblies and test 
equipment, documentation, documentation retrieval, display facilities, and crew 
skills. It also' includes the use of control and display equipment, checkout system, 
DMS software, and a centralized maintenance facility if required. 
6.2.2 BACKGROUND 
Traditionally, on-line (in-place) maintenance consists of the following 
elements: 
• Preparation 
•	 Fault Isolation 
• Access 
• 'Removal and Replacement 
.
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I Close-up 
. Adjustment/Calibration 
. Verification	 S 
Up to 80 percent of the total maintenance time has historically been used in 
isolating the fault to an assembly that was small enough to be replaced to get the 
equipment/system back into service. Fo17 many years the replaceable element 
was the lowest level possible, the nonrepairable piece part. Efforts to reduce 
maintenance time resulted in equipment modularization. This introduced a shop 
maintenance requirement where the fault within a module could be isolated and 
the faulty piece part removed and discarded. Soon even this activity was greatly 
curtailed, and the replaceable modules were returned to a central depot where the 
volume of repair activity was large enough to justify the expensive diagnostic 
equipment that was needed. In addition, a technician could become experienced 
and skilled enough to deal with the highly complex fault isolation process. 
Improvements in technology have reduced the size of many modules and 
integrated many functions into elements that are no longer individually replace-
able, raising the throw-away element to a higher functional level. The growth of 
system technology demanded that help be given to the maintenance technician if 
the system, or the equipment, were to be operable a sufficient amount of time to 
justify its existence and make it possible to perform the tasks it was originally 
designed to perform. 
Part of this help came in the form of higher reliability designed into the 
elements that made up the system. Another contribution was the development of 
self-monitoring and diagnostic routines that reduced the fault isolation time re-
quirement and made it possible to find faults that previously were nearly impos-
sible to isolate. Further contributions were made through the development of 
maintainability concepts which stressed accessibility and replaceability of the 
system modules. 
6.2.3 RESOURCES AND EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Effective onboard maintenance will contribute greatly to sustaining full 
operational ,
 capability in the Space Station in return for nominal use of available 
resources: DMS services, crew time, electrical power, weight, volume, and 
cost. ,
 Alternate maintenance concepts can be rated relative to each other on the 
basis of their consumption of these important resources. 
The Data Management Subsystem will be used for automatic control of fault 
detection, fault isolation, and automatic reconfiguration. Ideally, every fault will 
be traced automatically by the DMS to the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) in which the 
failure occurred, without crew intervention or interplay with the DMS. It is 
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unlikely that the ideal will ever be achieved, although it can be approached closely 
for a corresponding increase in software cost. The preliminary results of other 
study tasks have been used to derive the following rather pessimistic estimates. 
.	
Sixty percent of all electronic failures will be isolated automatically 
under DMS control to the faulty LRU without crew participation. 
.	
Twenty-seven percent of all electronic failures will be isolated to the 
faulty LRU by the crew, using the DMS as the diagnostic tool. 
. Thirteen percent of all electronic failures will be isolated to the faulty 
LRU by the crew, first using the DMS to isolate the fault to a group of 
LRUs and then using other means to complete fault isolation. 
The use of the DMS as described above is common to all maintenance 
concepts considered by this task. Its effectiveness in fault isolation is one of 
the factors contributing to the amount of crew time devoted to maintenance. 
Crew time is a resource of particular importance to achievement of primary 
mission objectives, and the amount of time needed for maintenance should be min-
imized. This is especially true of the Modular Space Station. 
Power, weight, and volume in electronic systems exhibit a strong correla-
tion, depending on the amount of equipment provided. For the purposes of this 
•	 study, it was sufficient to concentrate on weight, taking all the following into 
account. 
. Subsystems, including in-place redundant elements 
S Spares 
o Tools, test equipment, and maintenance aids, including manuals 
Cost of onboard equipment will be strongly correlated with the complexity 
(hence, weight) of that equipment, but is not readily quantifiable. This is even 
more true of the less obvious elements of program cost such as ground support 
equipment, personnel, and software. The cost of maintenance training of crew 
members can only be expressed in relative terms. 
6.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 
The two questions that are fundamental to definition of a maintenance 
approach are: 
. Where will maintenance be performed? 
• To what level will unscheduled maintenance be performed?
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6.3.1 LOCATION OF MAINTENANCEACTIVITY 
The study considered two locations in the Space Station for performing 
maintenance: in-place and in a central facility. Both unscheduled and scheduled 
maintenance actions have been considered. Unscheduled actions include fault 
isolation, repair, and verification. Repair may be limited to removal and re-
placement of a faulty unit or it may include physical repair of an assembly. 
Scheduled maintenance actions include preventive maintenance, calibration, and 
pre-installation checks. 
The number of ways maintenance actions can be assigned to the two locations 
is very large, but most combinations are illogical. To provide a reasonable basis 
for conducting the maintenance capability study, the four most appropriate 
approaches for accomplishing maintenance on the basis of location were identified 
as shown in Table 6-1. The two most suitable approaches were then selected, one 
for in-place maintenance and one for centralized maintenance. 
Total in-place maintenance was considered first. This approach seems 
feasible for all actions except physical repair, provided the disruption of sub-
system operation due to maintenance activities can be tolerated. It was concluded 
that repair activities, especially repairs that could contaminate the environment 
through residue such as wire scraps, solder, or the release of gases, should be 
performed in a controlled environment. Approach number two was therefore 
selected as the in-place maintenance approach. 
Table 6-1. Maintenance Action Allocations
Maintenance Approach  
1 
Isolation I I I C 
Unscheduled Repair I C C C 
Verification I I C C 
Preventive I I C C 
Scheduled Calibration I I C C 
Pre -Installation I I C C 
I	 = In-place	 C	 = Central
. 
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Two levels of centralized maintenance were considered. Maintenance 
approach No. 3 is a totally centralized maintenance approach with the exception 
that isolation of faults is performed in place. Approach No. 4 requires that all 
•	 manual maintenance actions be performed in the central facility. The capability 
to verify faults in a central facility will also include the capability for isolation 
of faults. Therefore, the selected centralized approach was the one that required 
all maintenance actions to be performed in the central facility. This means that 
fault isolation would be performed in place up to the point where crew intervention 
was required. Removal and replacement would be performed at the isolatable 
level. All other maintenance activity would be performed in the central facility. 
The need for a central maintenance facility depends upon selection of the 
hardware level (SRA or LRU) at which repair is to be effected. 
6.3.2 REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT LEVEL 
There are three basic techniques applicable to electronic maintenance in 
the Space Station. They are: 
• Substitution of a good LRU or SRA for one which may be faulty (i. e., 
one of a group to which a fault has been isolated). 
• Direct Replacement of an LRU or SRA known to be faulty with a good 
one, after fault isolation to the appropriate level. 
•	 Use of a Test Interface and special test equipment for fault isolation 
not achievable by the DMS or by Substitution. 
The applicability of each technique depends upon the choice made from the 
following options: 
• Repair action by replacement at either the LRU or SRA level. 
•	 Fault isolation by the DMS, with or without crew participation to 
(1) a group of LRUs, (2) a single LRU, or (3) the faulty SRA within 
the faulty LRU. 
• SRAs either pluggable or non-pluggable (welded or soldered in place) 
within the LRUs. A mix of pluggable and non-pluggable SRAs is also 
an admissible option. All LRUs are pluggable. 
.
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The maintenance techniques and options are interrelated as shown in Table 
6-2. Direct replacement is required in every instance for completion of repair 
action. Substitution applies where DMS/crew fault isolation does not extend to 
the replaceable device, except for non-pluggable SRAs. A test interface (for use 
of additional test equipment) is needed when (1) DMS/crew fault isolation does not 
extend to the replaceable and (2) fault isolation by substitution is not permitted. 
Where the replacement level is SRA, the capability of fault isolation to the LRUs 
is necessarily presupposed. 
An elementary evaluation has been constructed and is shown in Table 6-2, 
based on six categories of resource requirements. The scoring system is based 
on a minimum of 1.0 (least advantageous) to a maximum of 6.0 (most advantageous). 
When an approximate "tie" exists, scores are adjusted so that for each row the 
total is 21. 0. Given more time to pursue the evaluation in depth, with more detailed 
definitions of evaluation criteria and assignment of weighting factors, a different 
order of preference may result. But it is most likely that fault isolation and repair 
by replacement at the LRU level would still emerge as the preferred approach. 
6.4 LRU REPLACEMENT ANALYSIS 
This subsection will analyze the maintenance concept centered around 
repair by replacement at the LRU level. SRA level replacement will be dis-
cussed in Subsection 6.5., 
6.4.1 MAINTENANCE INCIDENTS 
The number of maintenance incidents over a long period of time is a 
function of the mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) estimated for the various 
LRUs included in each subsystem. As shown in Table 6-3, over a period of 
180 days, the unscheduled maintenance incidents were 23 for the DM, 3 for 
the GN&C, and 2 for the RF Communication Subsystems. These subsystems 
were considered to comprise 80 percent of the total electronics in all subsystems. 
The result is an estimated total of 35 electronic assembly failures in a period of 
180 days. The computation method is illustrated by example in Table 6-4. 
Scheduled maintenance incidents including preventive maintenance, 
calibration, and pre-installation checkout, were estimated to equal unscheduled 
maintenance incidents. The 1-to-1 ratio is based on records of scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance incidents occurring in commercial installations having 
similar functional capability. 
The scheduled incidents could be distributed over in-place and centralized 
maintenance facilities. The unscheduled maintenance incidents, however, could 
not be so distributed.
. 
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Table 6-2. Maintenance Concepts and Techniques 
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Table 6-3. Maintenance Incidents
Incidents per 180 Days 
Subsystem	 Unscheduled (1)	 Scheduled (2) 
DMS	 23	 23 
GN&CS	 3	 3 
RFCS	 2	 2 
Other	 7	 7 
Total	 35	 35 
Total incidents per 180 days = 70 
Average Incidents per day = 0. 4 
NOTES:
(1) Based on LRU reliability estimates. 
(2) Based on ground maintenance experience of one scheduled 
maintenance period per one unscheduled maintenance period. 
The minimum average number of in-place incidents per day would be 0. 21 
and the total incident rate of 0. 4 per day would be distributed according to the 
selected maintenance approach. The number of incidents is somewhat independent 
of the level of replaceability because it is based strictly upon the reliability 
(MTBF) estimated for the subsystems and upon an assumed schedule for per-
forming preventive maintenance. 
6.4.2 CREW TIME DEVOTED TO MAINTENANCE 
The requirement for manual assistance in fault isolation procedures was 
reviewed for all LRUs in the DM, GN&C, and RFC subsystems. It was estimated 
that 40 percent of the faults detected by the checkout software required assistance 
of the crew for isolation to a single LRU. The source of this estimate is shown 
in Table 6-5. All of these faults would require time for removal and replacement 
of the faulty LRU. This time is estimated at 0. 8 hour per incident. Of the faults 
that require manual assistance, it was estimated that 2/3 of the 40 percent re-
quiring manual assistance or 27 percent of the total faults could be isolated by 
manual intervention at the central Control and Display Console. The average time 
for this isolation was estimated at 1. 1 hours The remaining 1/3 of the faults that
II 
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Table 6-4. Sample Computation for Expected Number of Maintenance Incidents 
(Failures) 
F = N X T 
WHERE N = QUANTITY OF LINE ITEM USED IN THE SUBSYSTEM 
X = FAILURE RATE = MTBF 
I = LENGTH OF FORECAST PERIOD 
S-BAND VIDEO RECEIVER 
N = 10 
	
X	
- 1 -	 10 -6	 FAILURES 715K - .4 x  
T = CLOCK HOURS IN 
3 MONTHS x = 2.19 x 103 
6 MONTHS 2x Y 
36 MONTHS = 6Y
FAILURES (N)	 (X)	 (T)	 EXPECTED 
	
3 MONTHS	 10	 x	 1.4 x 106 x 2.19 x iO
	
.0306 
	
6 MONTHS	
.0306	 x	 2	 =	
-	 .0611 36 MONTHS	
.0611	 x	 6	
.368 
require manual assistance or the remaining 13 percent of the total faults would 
require local intervention. The total time required for isolation was estimated 
at 2.2 hours. The average time per incident as a result of these figures is 1.8 
hours which includes a factor of 30 percent for retries. 
Crew involvement in each step was estimated as indicated in Table 6-6. 
The resulting total manhours per incident is 3. 0. A brief survey was made to 
verify these figures using IBM commercial equipment experience as a guide. 
The results are shown in Table 6-7. 
Four units that are typical of a Data Management Subsystem were selected 
and their unscheduled and scheduled manhours per incident were estimated using 
commercial experience as a base. The quantity of each unit used in the Space 
Station Data Management Subsystem are also listed in Table 6-6. The ratio of 
failures among the four types of units was computed from the subsystem to MTBF 
data. This information was factored and averaged to provide the result of 1.8 hours 
per unscheduled maintenance incident and 1. 7 hours per scheduled maintenance 
incident. 
.
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Table 6-5. Automatic Fault Isolation Efficiency
LRUs Requiring LRUs Subsystem Manual Assistance Considered for Fault Isolation 
DM 59 32 
GN&C 39 7 
RFC 46 1 9 
Total 144 58 
. 
40 percent of faults require manual assistance to isolate to the LRU level. 
(See Appendix B.) 
Table 6-6. Crew Time per Incident 
No. of
	 Fault Isolation	 Fl	 R&R	 R&R	 Total Total 
Incidents	 Manhours	 Manhours Hours Manhours Hours Men	 Hours Men 
A	 B	 C	 D	 E	 F	 G	 H	 T 
-- 60 ---	 --	
---	 1.0	 1.5	 1.5 60 90 
27	 1.4	 2	 2.8	 1.0	 1.5	 1.5 65 116 
13	 2.9	 2	 5.8	 1.0	 1.5	 1.5 51 95 
Totals 176 301
NOTES: 100 incidents assumed 
Col. D = Col. B x Col. C 
Col. G = Col. E x Col. F 
Col. H = (Col. B + Col. E) x Col. A 
Col. T = (Col. D + Col. G) x Col. A 
Quantity incolumns B and E contains 
a factor of 30 percent for retries. 
Av. Hours/Incident =	 1.8 
Av. Manhours/Incident = 	 3. 0
. 
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Table 6-7. DMS Maintenance Manhours per Incident (Commercial Experience) 
Un- 
. scheduled Scheduled Incident Factored Hours Manhours Quantity Unit Manhours Ratio 
per per Incident (IR) Unscheduled	 Scheduled Incident 
Magnetic 
Tape 1.0 0.3 9 30 270.0	 81.0 
Magnetic 
Disc 3.0 4.0 6 30 540.0	 720.0 
Main 
Memory 1.5 1.8 16 1 24.0	 28.8
Central 
Processing	 1.2	 0.3	 6	 5	 36.0	 9.0 
Unit
(Q . IR) =496	 870.0	 838.8 
.
	 Average Hours per Incident 	 1.8	 1.7 
When the involvement of more than one crew member is considered, the total 
manhour expenditure is 3. 0 hours. This value is used as the basis for the Data 
Management Subsystem average manhours per unscheduled maintenance incident. 
A somewhat smaller figure of 2. 7 hours per incident was used for the other sub-
systems because of the electromechanical equipment included in the Data Manage-
ment Subsystem. These values are summarized in Table 6-8, where it can be 
seen that the total number of manhours involved in unscheduled maintenance for 
the electronic portions of the subsystems was computed to be 101 for the 180-day 
resupply period. An equal number of manhours was estimated for scheduled 
maintenance activity. Note in Table 6-8 that there are 202 manhours of main-
tenance activity (both scheduled and unscheduled) in the 180-day period. This 
amounts to an average of L 13 hours per day or 7.9 hours per week. 
It is important to note that only. 13 percent of the total maintenance incidents 
actually involved use of test equipment; therefore, an average of 0. 36 incidents per 
week required the use of test equipment. If fault isolation by substitution is 
allowed, none of the unscheduled incidents require the use of test equipment.
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6.4.3 MAINTENANCE SPARES 
The next step in the LRU replacement level study was to estimate the weight 
of spare parts required for various resupply cycles and spares availability con-
fidence levels. The electronic portions of the DMS, GN&C and RFC Subsystems 
were estimated to weigh 9160 pounds, as shown in Table 6-9. The remaining 
subsystems' electronics were estimated at 20 percent of the total weight of ele-
tronic assemblies. The basic subsystem electronics weight was estimated at 
11, 450 pounds. 
Weight of spare LRUs was computed for resupply intervals of 3, 6, and 36 
months and availability confidence levels of 95 percent and 99 percent. The 
quantity of spare LRUs was computed on the basis of individual LRU MTBF 
estimates. The results are shown in Table 6-10. They indicate that a Space 
Station resupplied at three-month intervals but having spares on board for a six-
month resupply cycle would require approximately 2500 pounds of spares for a 
95 percent confidence level and 4500 pounds of electronic spares for a 99 percent 
confidence level. A non-resupplied mission having a duration of 36 months would 
carry 10, 000 pounds of electronic spares for a 95 percent confidence level and 
16, 000 pounds of electronic spares for a 99 percent confidence level. 
Table 6-9. Subsystem Electronics Basic Weight (lbs) 
LRU Level Replacement 
SDMS	 5,700 
GN&S	 1,680 
RFCS	 1,780 
	
9, 160	 80% estimate 
EC/LS 
Prop	 )	 2,290	 20010 
Struct 
Pwr  
11, L150
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Table 6-10. Subsystem Spares Weight (ibs) 
Resupply Cycle/Confidence Level 
Sub-	 3 m	 6 m	 36 m 
System	 95	 99	 95	 99	 95	 99 
DMS 894 2,362 1,864 2,938 71 553 11,406 
GNC 48 228 83 582 761 1,006 
RFCS 24 86 34 1.03 200 350 
Total 966 2,676 1,981 3,623 8,514 12,760 
Other 242 669 495 906 2,128 3,190
Total	 1,208	 3,345
	 2,476
	
4,529	 10,642	 15,950 
Figure 6-1 compares LRU level spares requirements with the basic sub-
system weight for the two confidence levels. For example, a mission having a 
duration of 36 months would require spares equal to the weight of basic subsystem 
electronics to achieve a 95 percent confidence level. To achieve a 99 percent 
confidence level, spares' weight would be 150 percent of basic subsystem 
electronics weight. 
6.4.4 SUMMARY - LRU LEVEL REPLACEMENT 
This portion of the study points out that subsystem reliability (MTBF) and the 
drift and wearout characteristics of the subsystem equipment are dominant factors 
in the definition of a Maintenance Capability. 
The unscheduled and scheduled maintenance incidents predicted for the Space 
Station average less than 3 per week. The Checkout Subsystem is 60 percent 
effective in automatically locating faults to the level of a single LRU. With limited 
assistance from the crew, executing fault isolation procedures at a central Control 
and Display Console, 87 percent of the unscheduled incidents are corrected by 
removal and replacement of the LRU indicated by the Checkout Subsystem. The 
remaining 13 percent of the unscheduled maintenance incidents require inter-
vention in terms of LRU substitution or monitoring of test interfaces. 
The degree of automation of the scheduled maintenance incidents may be 
similar to that predicted for the unscheduled incidents. For example, calibration 
procedures are expected to be semiautomatic. A crew man may enter calibration 
parameters. Error data will be automatically acquired and entered into error 
matrices.
A 
El 
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The need for pre-installation checkout of assemblies is expected to be 
minimal. In instances when it is necessary, the check will most likely be per-
formed using software and will not require monitoring of test interfaces. 
Scheduled maintenance incidents that result from wearout characteristics 
of electromechanical assemblies or from drift characteristics of designs that are 
at the limit of the state-of-the-art may form the greatest requirement for a 
maintenance capability. 
Scheduled maintenance can be further minimized on Earth orbital missions 
by replacing assemblies such as magnetic tape and disc units and refurbishing 
them at a ground depot. 
Results of this portion of the study are summarized in Table 6-11. 
Conclusions regarding LRU level replacement are as follows: 
1. The expected involvement of crew members in maintenance at the 
LRU level does produce a significant impact on crew activity scheduling. 
2. The requirements for test equipment, if isolation by substitution is 
allowed, can be limited to the equipment needed to adjust for wearout 
and drift. Both of these requirements can be minimized on Earth-
Orbital missions by periodic replacement of the assemblies or by 
adequate spare assemblies on board. 
3. The low number of maintenance incidents does not justify a central 
test facility. 
4. A sparing philosophy that allows a high confidence level for availability 
of spare assemblies precludes the need for a central repair facility. 
The conclusions given above, even though they strongly indicate that a 
centralized Maintenance Facility is not needed for Earth Orbital missions, are 
not meant to indicate that the need for a significant maintenance capability does 
not exist. The maintenance capability, consisting of items such as hand and power 
tools, portable test equipment, portable data entry and display unit, maintenance 
documentation file and viewing unit, and crew and spare assembly restraining and 
translation devices, will be addressed during the rest of the study. 
Further, this portion of the study has not fully considered the unique re-
quirements of long duration, non-resupplied missions. Some of these requirements 
are explored in the following paragraphs. 
6-16
Table 6-11. Summary-LRU Level Replacement 
. 
.
LRU LEVEL REPLACEMENT 
All maintenance in place 
No repair 
FACTOR 
Incidents 
Total 
Requiring Test 
Equipment 
Crew Time 
Total 
Using Test Equipment 
Weight 
Spares for 6 months 
Resupply Cycle 
Tools, Test Equipment 
Documentation, Maintenance 
Aids
REQUIREMENT 
2,8 per week 
36 per week 
7.9 manhours per week 
1.0 hour per week 
2500 lbs at 959/o confidence 
4500 lbs at 99% confidence 
600 lbs (estimated) 
The final decision regarding the need for a centralized facility may also be 
impacted by consideration of the test and repair requirements for other than 
electronic equipment, such as electrical, chemical and mechanical assemblies. 
6.5 SRA LEVEL REPLACEMENT APPROACH 
This portion of the report compares LRU and SRA levels of replacement and 
considers physical repair of non-pluggable SRAs. 
An LRU/SRA comparison using the LRU data as the baseline is shown in 
Table 6-12. 
The SRA approach assumes a mix of pluggable and non-pluggable assemblies. 
SRA design reliability would be decreased due to added connectors but might also 
be strengthened by increases in commonality. This comparisoxi assumes the SRA 
design could be as reliable as the LRU design. The number of unscheduled main-
tenance incidents, therefore, would remain essentially the same.
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The number of scheduled incidents for calibration and preventive maintenance 
would also remain essentially the same. There might, however, be some slight 
increase in the need to perform pre-installation test due to the greater number of 
pluggable assemblies. 
Crew time requirements would increase as the levels of replacement in-
crease, assuming the automatic fault isolation capability remains at the LRU 
or multiple LRU level. 
Crew time for scheduled maintenance should remain the same, because 
preventive maintenance and calibration procedures would remain essentially the 
same.
The crew time for unscheduled maintenance would definitely increase because 
of the added time to isolate to the SRA level. It has been estimated that unscheduled 
maintenance crew time would increase by a factor of 3. The overall increase in 
utilization in crew time would be from 8. 4 to 17. 5 hours per week. 
As the level of pluggability or replaceability is increased, it is estimated 
that there would be as much as a 10 percent increase in the basic subsystem 
weight. This will amount to a penalty of 1145 pounds. However, because of the 
increase in level of replaceability, an overall decrease in spares weight of about 
30 percent is predicted. For example, the 4529 pounds predicted for achieving 
99 percent confidence level for a 180-day resupply period would be reduced to 
approximately 3000 pounds. 
The lower level of replacement and the need to replace non-pluggable 
assemblies also will increase the quantity of tools, test equipment, and main-
tenance aids. An increase of 1200 pounds beyond that needed for the LRU level 
replacement is estimated. This figure does not include the capability for fault 
isolation and operational verification in a central facility. It does include the 
facilities to repair to the lowest replaceable level and to test the quality of 
physical repair. 
It should be noted that if it were possible to provide software to isolate to 
the SRA level and if all SRAs were pluggable and substitution were permitted, then 
no test equipment would be required. This is believed to be a prohibitively 
idealistic approach. 
The overall impact on weight due to SRA level of replacement is shown in 
Figure 6-2. The basic subsystem and Maintenance Facility weight to support 
SRA level of replacement is approximately 2300 pounds, or 20 percent more than 
the weight of subsystems and Maintenance Facility required to support LRU level 
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replacement. There is a cross over in total weight in the range of an 8-to-15-
month resupply interval, depending upon the confidence level required for the 
mission. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The most significant conclusions at this point in the study are: 
o LRU level replacement and in-place maintenance are recommended 
for resupplied missions. 
o A capability for SRA level repair. should be developed. 
• A Maintenance Facility should be included in the Space Station to 
develop techniques and acquire experience in in-space maintenance/ 
in preparation for long-duration, non-resupplied missions. 
Long duration, non-resupplied missions will need the capability for SRA 
level replacements and repair. The success of this level of replacement depends 
upon achieving a high degree of pluggability, in-place fault isolation, in-place 
preventive maintenance, and design commonality. If these items can be achieved, 
then SHA level replacement is feasible, especially if it is supported by low level 
fault isolation software and the ability to substitute assemblies as opposed to 
monitoring test interfaces. 
The long duration mission should have a central facility for repair. However, 
its primary purpose may not be for repair of an anticipated fault, since pluggable 
spares will be available to account for most of these faults. The main function of 
the facility is to provide for the recovery from design problems that are not dis-
cerned before the spacecraft is launched or for accidents that happen during the 
mission which result in using all available spare assemblies. The central facility, 
therefore, is essential for working around problems that are unforseen in 
addition to supporting the repair actions that can be anticipated.
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Section 7
TOOLS AND TEST EQUIPMENT 
Presently available definitions of Space Station subsystem and equipment 
designs are not adequate for precise specification of tools or test equipment. It is 
feasible, however, to predict qualitatively what the requirements will be. 
It has been previously concluded that, for resupplied missions, the preferred 
electronic maintenance approach is one in which fault isolation is to the LRU, and 
repair is effected by removal and replacement of LRUs. The maintenance items 
needed to support this activity are indicated qualitatively in Table 7-1. If fault 
isolation and replacement extend to the SRA level, then additional maintenance 
items are needed, also as shown in Table 7-1. 
A considerable amount of in-place maintenance activity is expected in the 
resupplied Space Station. The Portable Astronaut's Test Kit described briefly in 
Subsection 7. 1 is an excellent start toward providing maintenance items to support 
that activity. Additional central maintenance items will be needed, as listed in 
Subsection 7.2. 
7. 1 PORTABLE ASTRONAUT'S TEST KIT (PATK) 
Initial design and fabrication of a kit to contain the tools and test equipment 
that an astronaut would need for inplace maintenance on a space vehicle were done 
in 1969-1970 by Martin-Marietta Corporation under a contract to NASA-MSFC. 
The final report on this contract is referenced (item 19) in Subsection 3. 6. This 
kit was designed to meet the requirements of representative inpiace maintenance 
tasks which included mechanical and electromechanical maintenance tasks rather 
than electronic maintenance tasks. The following representative tasks were 
demonstrated in simulated space conditions using the contents of the kit: 
. Removal and replacement of a typical spacecraft mechanical system 
fluid pump. 
• Inplace fault confirmation, and subsequent removal and replacement of 
a battery charger and regulator module. 
• Inpiace fault diagnosis of a command-signal type, manually operated, 
rotary switch.
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Table 7-1. Maintenance Item Requirements
Required for 
Types of Maintenance Items
	 LRU	 SRA 
Meters X X 
Oscilloscopes x-
Maintenance Aids Nominal More detailed 
Procedures Viewer X x 
R&R Tools X X 
Assembly Tools x 
Positioners X X 
Restraints X X 
Multipurpose Test Equipment x 
Power Tools X 
Data Entry and Display X X 
Intercom x X 
Diagnostic Routines X More detailed 
Stimulus Generators X 
Analyzers X 
Loads X 
Skill Nominal Greater
• Removal and replacement of a typical spacecraft mechanical system 
pressure regulator valve. 
•	 Removal and replacement of a typical spacecraft system, fluid-line 
installed, pressure transducer. 
The following items were selected to be included in the basic kit or special 
purpose sub kits: 
1. installed or Incorporated in Kit 
a. Electrical Multimeter (one) 
b. Portable lights (two hand-held, extendible with mounting provisions
. 
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C. 
d. 
e. 
f.
g. 
h. 
1. 
1. 
k. 
I. 
2. Ca 
a. 
O b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f.
g. 
h. 
1. 
3. 
k.
Task procedures readout device (one, lighted panel) 
Test probes (compatible with 1. a, above) 
Kit mounting boom (one, foldaway type) 
Battery power supply (one, integral, mockup) 
Small spares stowage compartment (one or more) 
Large spares mounting panel (one or more) 
Astronaut carrying and translation handle (one, fixed) 
Work-shelf-type panel with parts restraint devices (one) 
Tether connection fixtures (two or more) 
Astronaut and equipment tethers (two or more) 
rried or Stored in Kit 
Screwdrivers (set; includes panel fastener tool) 
Pliers (one) 
Crescent wrench (one) 
Diagonal wire cutters (one) 
Metal shears (one) 
Tape dispensing reels (two) 
Safety wire dispenser (one) 
General purpose tie cord dispenser (one) 
Leak seal material dispenser (one) 
Fluid containment device (one) 
Mechanical leak seal plugs (set) 
.
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1.	 General purpose rags (one or more) 
m.	 Velcro tape fastener patches (set) 
n.	 Electrical test leads with clips (two) 
3.	 Carried or Stored in Sub-Kits 
a.	 Mechanical 
(1)	 Deep-well socket set (3/8 inch drive) 
(2)	 Ratchet for socket set (one) 
(3)	 Open-end wrench set 
(4)	 Vise grips wrench (one) 
(5)	 Allen wrench set 
(6)	 Thread cleaning/deburring tool 
(7)	 Parts retriever tool 
(8)	 Soft face hammer* 
(9)	 Drift punch* 
(10)	 Torque wrench* 
(11)	 Leak detector* 
(12)	 Vacuum and pressure sensing and measuring device* 
(13)	 Portable N2 storage and spray container* 
(14)	 Window glass cleaner* 
(15)	 Decontamination kit* 
(16)	 Ablative material kit*
*These items are reserved for sub-kits that could be formulated, but are not 
furnished as elements of the mockup kit.
. 
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(17) 
(18) 
.	 (19)
(20) 
(21) 
b. EIE
Space suit repair kit* 
Electron beam welder* 
Portable vacuum cleaner* 
Small portable power tool kit* 
Elapsed time indicator* 
ctrical 
(1) Pin alignment tool (one) 
(2) Electrical Connector tool (one) 
(3) Wire stripper and crimping tool (one) 
(4) Terminal lugs (set) 
In developing the contents of each of the kits, attention was given to functional 
grouping of elements and desired presentation to an astronaut in a typical space-
craft. Design criteria for packaging development included the following: 
1. One astronaut will manually transport the kit from location to location. 
2. The kit shall easily pass through a 24-inch diameter opening. 
3. The kit shall be suitable for use by an astronaut in the following 
environmental modes: 
a. WA, astronaut in "shirt-
 leeve" uniform 
b. WA, astronaut in unpressurized space suit 
C. WA, astronaut in pressurized space suit 
d. EVA, astronaut in pressurized space suit 
4. Specialty tools may be considered being available in modularized, sub-
kits that can be attached to the basic kit. 
*These items are reserved for sub-kits that could be formulated, but were not 
furnished as elements of the mockup kit.
.
7-5
This kit, or sub-kits, would be stored in the maintenance facility. It contains 
the majority of the hand tools that would be required for activities in the maintenance 
facility as well as for remove-and-replace requirements in place. 
7.2 ADDITIONAL CENTRAL MAINTENANCE ITEMS 
The following maintenance items are required in the Central Facility in 
addition to those included in the Portable Kit. 
1. Work bench 
2. Chair with foot holds and seat belt 
3. Small parts retaining shelf (magnetic or laminar flow pad) 
4. Maintenance debris collection device 
5. Gauges for measuring: 
a. Temperature 
b. Pressure 
c. Vacuum 
6. Micrometers - 0 - 1 inch, 1-3 inch 
7. EMI meter 
8. Special coveralls 
9. Electrical insulating materials 
10. Rubber gloves 
11. Emergency lighting 
12. Oscilloscope 
13. Oscilloscope probes 
14. Connector pin insert-extract tools 
15. Storage for Portable Kit and sub kits
. 
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16. Soldering kit 
17. Welding kit (for electronic component interconnection) 
18. Multiple-use power supply 
19. General-purpose stimulus generator 
20. Portable display and control unit 
21. Maintenance Data storage and retrieval unit
.
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Section 8
MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
The study results strongly indicate that, although a centralized electronic 
LRU repair capability is not required in the resupplied Space Station, the Space 
Station mission itself provides an excellent opportunity for development of onboard 
repair capability in support of later long-duration non-resupplied missions. Space 
maintenance development in the Space Station should be the major contributor to a 
total program which, building on work done prior to that time, will culminate in 
the complete capability desired. The basic concept is one of: (a) ground-based 
development of equipment, techniques, and procedures, including design of experi-
ment/test routine to be used in the Space Station; (b) transportation of a complete 
experiment package to the Space Station; (c) performance of the experiments, 
recording pertinent data and evaluation; and (d) return of experiment equipment 
and data to Earth. 
Important work has been done in development of human factors criteria for 
in-space zero-g maintenance, zero-g tool (e.g. reactionless powered rotary 
drivers) concepts, and the Portable Astronaut's Test Kit previously mentioned 
(Section 7). In order to complete the transition to the Space Station maintenance 
development program summarized above, several supporting research and 
technology tasks should be performed. 
Present Skylab Program plans call for performance of several on-orbit 
activities which will serve as precursors to Space Station maintenance experiments. 
The most notable are the following. 1 
.	 M507, Gravity Substitute Workbench, an experiment to assess the merits

of using aerodynamic and electrostatic forces as gravity substitutes. 
• M507, EVA/IVA Workside Simulation, intended to evaluate the capa-
bilities of crewmen to perform selected manual operations using various 
conditions of restraint. 
• M512, Materials Processing in Space, to demonstrate and evaluate 
molten metal behavior in a space environment. Although directed toward 
manufacturing, this experiment should illuminate some of the problems 
involved in soldering under zero-g conditions. 
1 "Mission Requirements, Skylab Missions SL-1/SL-2, SL-3 and SL-4," NASA 
Document 1-MRD-001C, August 1970 (DRAFT).
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8.1 ADDITIONAL SRT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study has identified several maintenance aids that would be common to 
both Earth orbital and non-resupplied missions. Specific commonalities are: 
1. Portable test module to supplement software fault isolation and to assist 
mechanical adjustments and calibration. 
2. Hand tools required for removal and replacement of electronic 
assemblies. 
3. Devices for transporting and positioning spare assemblies. These 
devices include translation equipment such as pulley systems and 
conveyors, foot and hand holds, and special chairs and grips that allow 
the astronaut to provide reactive forces necessary to maintain his 
position relative to the equipment. 
A long-duration non-resupplied mission will require a Central Repair and 
Test bench for maintenance of LRUs. 
The following tasks are proposed to provide further definition of maintenance 
equipment design requirements: 
1. Design and construct a Repair and Test Bench, including small-parts 
retaining shelf and debris collection devices. 
2. Define requirements for, design and construct a portable test assembly, 
based on knowledge gained from the PATK but concentrating on elec-
tronic testing. 
3. Design of accessability, to include intra-vehicular movement of equip-
ment and accessibility to test points, assemblies, and parts for 
maintenance. 
4. Select or develop a computer program to determine spares requirements 
based upon all relevant parameters: reliability, resupply internal, cost, 
and limitation on spares storage and one-trip resupply capability. The 
model and program should include a mix of LRUs and SRAs. 
5. Design a computer-controlled spares inventory and retrieval system 
capable of managing all Space Station spares, minimizing retrieval time 
and ordering replacements for Shuttle delivery.
Ll 
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6. Modify designs of subsystems and equipment (LRUs) and DMS software 
to achieve maximum practicable efficiency of automatic fault isolation to 
single LRUs. This effort is appropriate for Phase C of the Space Station 
program. 
7. Perform a refined trade analysis between levels of onboard maintenance 
(LRU . versus SRA) based on models which include comprehensive life 
cycle cost as well as more accurate assessments of resources (crew 
time, skill, weight, etc.) needed to support each concept. The models 
should be sufficiently flexible that changes in input data (especially 
equipment reliability) can be readily accommodated. 
Other tasks could be cited but are considered less important than those 
listed above. The first three are of sufficient importance to warrant elaboration 
in the following subsections.. 
8.2 REPAIR AND TEST BENCH 
Figure 8-1 is a conceptual drawing of a Repair and Test Bench. The bench 
includes two basic modules. The right-hand module is associated with physical 
repair of assemblies. The left-hand module provides for electronic testing of 
assemblies. 
The right-hand module contains the hand and power tools required to perform 
soldering, welding (terminal), crimping, splicing, drilling, and cutting. The left-
hand module contains power supplies and signal and function generators that pro-
vide the capability for limited simulation of the operational interfaces. A panel is 
provided for connecting the assembly under test and a patchboard is used to apply 
voltages and signals. An oscilloscope and multimeter are provided for test point 
monitoring. :A documentation viewer is also provided for display of maintenance 
drawings and procedures. The multimeter, oscilloscope, and documentation 
viewer are similar in capability to the units described in Task 1. 
-	 Maintenance of electronic assemblies during a mission requires tools and 
test equipment compatible with the lowest level of fault isolation. Adequate tools, 
test equipment, training, and documentation would allow replacement levels equal 
to those that could be economically achieved in a ground facility. The objective 
of this task is the definition of a space experiment that would determine the lowest 
feasible level of in-flight maintenance.
.
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Figure 8-1. Repair and Test Bench
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An. in-flight maintenance facility must accommodate changes in two major 
parameters or conditions that exist in a ground facility. It must accommodate and 
it must not contaminate the environment. Accommodating these changes requires 
several important considerations. 
1. Control of position of tools, materials, and residue. 
2. Provision of a zero reaction system that will allow the astronaut to 
utilize tools and make control adjustments while maintaining his physical 
orientation with the work. 
It is assumed that other problems such as adequate training, documentation, 
and test equipment capability can be resolved. 
Features of the bench are the following: 
1. All storage covers are slide or roll. 
2. 'Cords on commonly used power tools will be fed from a reel. 
3. All powered tools are controlled by switches in handles. 
4. Various assembly holding fixtures are mounted to bench top and 
accommodate the electronic chassis. 
5.' A residue and small parts trap is provided in the bench top. 
6. Powered and large hand tools are mounted on rotating tables in storage 
bins. Magnetic and mechanical latches will be considered. 
7. All tools other than squeeze-operated tools may be operated with one 
hand. When it is necessary to hold the work and a tool, either two 
astronauts will be required or a specially constructed chair must 
provide stability. 
The chair or other astronaut restraint used during the maintenance procedure 
should be designed so that applying tools to the equipment will not cause the 
astronaut to change position. A significant mechanical design and human factor 
problem is presented by this requirement. Underwater flotation test may be 
employed whenever feasible to test design approaches. 
Use of devices such as a welding head requires that both the head and the 
assembly be attached to a holding fixture to be repaired. Welding would be per-
formed after adjustment of the head and the work. The astronaut would not be in 
contact with the equipment while the weld was being made.
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Other common bench activities include wire stripping and cutting, terminal 
crimping, and terminal insertion. Tools that are operated by squeezing are now 
available for these operations and, therefore, should be the most adaptable to the 
space maintenance activity. 
This SRT task would include the following activities: 
1. Design and fabrication of bench and chair mock-ups for underwater 
tests. 
The mock-up will be used to optimize dimensions of the bench, storage 
bin design, and location of controls and tools, and to access limitations. 
2. Development of general specification for power supplies and signal 
and function generators. 
3. Development of general specification for multimeter, oscilloscope, and 
special attachments, with emphasis on human factors requirements. 
4. Design of residue collection system. 
One important aspect of in-flight maintenance is the trapping of small 
parts, tools, wire clippings, and other maintenance residue. The 
feasibility of using a low pressure air draft across the bench surface and 
energy absorbing screens to accomplish trapping of these items will be 
explored. This approach may require that the immediate volume around 
the test bench be shut off by an air tight wall from other portions of the 
spacecraft. Thus, the maintenance bench would operate in a closed 
system that could not affect the, environment or the position of items in 
other parts of the spacecraft. 
5. Selection or design and fabrication of sample holding fixtures. 
6. Development of specification and design plan for an experimental Repair 
and Test Bench to be flown as an experiment. 
8.3 PORTABLE TEST ASSEMBLY 
Functions of the Portable Test Assembly are: 
1. To perform fault isolation beyond the automatic fault isolation capability 
provided by the checkout software. 
2. To assist calibration of analog assemblies. 
3. To make analog measurements in support of mechanical adjustment 
procedures. 
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The Portable Test Assembly (Figure 8-2) described in this task assumes 
that stimulus generators will be incorporated in the operational system or will be 
available as separate test modules and will be temporarily mounted to the Portable 
Test Assembly. This task also assumes that communication with the processor 
will be accomplished by voice communication to an astronaut at the Central Control 
Console or by use of a Local Monitor and Display Unit (LMDU) as described in 
the Phase B Space Station Studies. It includes a keyboard and a CRT for entry and 
display of data. The unit is pluggable to the data bus at many points within the 
Space Station. It may be separately mounted on an extendable arm and maneuvered 
in close proximity to the Portable Test Assembly. 
The Portable Test Assembly must have the capability to monitor both digital 
and analog signals. Special interfaces would be required to monitor RF signals. 
The basic test assembly, as shown in Figure 8-2, consists of: 
1. Oscilloscope with the required probes and signal matching devices. 
2. Digital multimeter. 
3. Maintenance documentation viewer with provision for separate viewing 
of maintenance index and maintenance drawings and procedures. 
Figure 8-2 also indicates access for storing and changing maintenance 
documentation microfilms. A drawer is provided for storing hand tools, special 
•	 oscilloscope and meter attachments, and test leads. Provision is included in the 
drawer for capturing small parts or assemblies that may be involved in the main-
tenance procedure. Supplementary maintenance apparatus such as stimuli gen-
erators or special measuring devices would be fastened under the Portable Test 
Assembly. 
Power and cooling accommodations for the test assembly would be provided 
through the extendable mounting arm. Details of the arm are not included in 
Figure 8-2, but several designs have been shown in other Space Station studies. 
The extension arm is fastened to the wall of the Station adjacent to power and 
cooling outlets. This SRT task would include the following activities: 
1. Determination of allowable dimensions and weight of the Portable Test 
Assembly. These parameters would be defined for both Earth and 
space handling and positioning conditions and will consider the isle 
space anticipated for a 16 foot diameter equipment module. It is 
desirable that the assembly be mountable in and operate with the Repair 
and Test Bench. 
S
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2. Definition of required characteristics of oscilloscope, multimeter, and 
special attachments that would allow widest range of usage of these 
instruments. 
3. Definition of test assembly power and cooling requirements. 
4. Organization of maintenance data, selection of storage media, and 
definition of retrieval and display equipment. 
Figure 8-2 indicates the capability to separately view a maintenance 
index and the maintenance documentation. This approach may provide 
the most efficient retrieval procedure. A design by Republic Aviation 
Division of Fairchild Hiller Corporation, called "Micro-Vue," is an 
example of the concept. 
5. Study of the physical interface between the astronaut and the test 
assembly. This study will define the required ambient light level, 
clearances between the test and operational equipment, and means for 
effectively achieving zero reaction operation of detented and non-
detented controls and insertion and removal of test leads. This task 
must also define the means for trapping small parts and tools during 
the maintenance procedures. 
A mockup of the test assembly will be constructed. It should be suitable 
for test in an underwater laboratory. 
8.4 DESIGN FOR ACCESSIBILITY 
This task covers three aspects of design for maintenance accessibility. 
1. Transportation of spare assemblies within the spacecraft and ease of 
removal and replacement of electronic assemblies. 
2. Accessibility to operational equipment test points for in-place testing. 
3. Accessibility to test points, subassemblies, and piece parts, for bench 
testing and repair of electronic assemblies. 
Major activities and consideration related to each task are summarized 
below.
The problem of transporting equipment between the maintenance and storage 
areas and the operational areas will require the development of translation devices. 
These devices may be extensions to the development of conveyor systems used in 
. 
S
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the Apollo missions and must accommodate assemblies of various dimensions,. 
densities, and fragility. The translation harness design must consider attachment, 
positioning, and detachment of a wide variety of assemblies. Underwater tests 
will be performed to determine passage and hatch clearances, turning radii, 
attachment, and release of assemblies by the astronaut and time involved in per-
forming the translation operation. 
Fittings will be designed for passages, isles, and equipment racks to 
accommodate astronaut and equipment restraints, harnesses, and grips. These 
devices will be designed to be compatible with the translation equipment and 
removal and replacement tools. 
Other studies have detailed the design of zero reaction hand and power tools 
and fasteners. This task will define unique requirements not covered in previous 
studies. 
Access to test points and subassemblies can result in high penalties in terms 
of weight and volume. Line replaceable units defined for the Engineering Study of 
Onboard Checkout Techniques will be reviewed to identify units that would: 
• Require test points for fault isolation, calibration, or mechanical 
adjustment. 
• Benefit from the ability to replace subassemblies and, possibly, 
piece-parts. 
For example an overall reduction in weight of spare assemblies might 
result from the ability to replace a low MTBF item in an LRU. 
The sample requirements for test points, and subassembly and piece-part 
replacement will be used to define accessibility criteria and test and repair tool, 
test lead, and special holding fixture requirements. 
Packaging of electronic digital and analog circuits can have a significant 
effect on level of replacement. The partitioning of circuits into packages may be 
accomplished with different end objectives. Objectives may include: 
1. Highest reliability 
2. Fewest total assemblies 
3. Greatest common usage of assemblies 
4. Least fault isolation software 
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These objectives oppose each other to some extent and all cannot be applied 
fully to one design problem. This task proposes to explore further the benefits 
and penalties of partitioning selected Electronic Subsystem's elements and to 
.	 optimize items 3 and 4 without compromising reliability. The results of this task 
will be used in the definition of test points, and characteristics of test instruments, 
power supplies, and signal generation equipment proposed for the Portable and' 
Bench Test Assemblies. 
Another task is the determination of the feasibility of a standard interface. 
The standard interface would be a common interface design applied to all major 
interfaces within the Data Management Subsystem. One purpose of a standard 
interface would be to minimize the complexity of test equipment required to pro-
vide an operational environment for dynamically testing a Line Replaceable Unit. 
For example, if a peripheral device such as a disk file were to be tested in the 
maintenance facility, the standard interface design would allow direct connection 
of the disk channel to a data bus terminal. Standard software could be used to 
exercise the disk. If a standard interface is not provided, it would be necessary 
to include a data bus controller, CPU, and core memory in the Maintenance 
Facility in order to test a disk. The result would be more equipment to maintain 
and additional penalties of power, weight, and volume. One alternative, would be 
to use spare operational assemblies as test equipment. This approach could 
result in carrying an additional set of operational spares in order to have testing 
capability when the normal complement of operational spares was exhausted. 
F_
.
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Appendix A 
MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
DATA SHEETS 
The Maintenance Requirements Analysis matrix provides a synoptic view of 
the maintenance requirements of each major electronic subsystem. The analysis, 
when complete*, will consider all elements of the Data Management and Communi-
cations Subsystems and major electronic control elements of the Guidance, Naviga-
tion, and Control and DMS and RF Communication Subsystems. The information 
on the matrix may be used to examine the following factors that affect the overall 
availability of subsystem equipment to conduct stationkeeping and experiment 
operations. 
• Consistency of operational recovery methods based on software 
reconfiguration and critical down time limitations. 
• Ability to maintain adequate operational capabilities while failed 
equipment is being removed, replaced, and verified. 
• Overall summary of periodic preventive maintenance requirements for 
calibration and adjustment of electronic and electromechanical equipment. 
• Similarity of maintenance tools, test equipment, training, and facilities 
requirements among and within subsystems. 
• Availability of astronaut time to perform preventive and corrective 
maintenance. 
The following are descriptions of the headings of each column in the Main-
tenance Requirements Analysis matrix. 
Column 1 - Group 
A group is a major element of a subsystem, usually containing several Line 
Replaceable Units. 
* Completion of the MRA on all subsystems is beyond the scope of the present 
contract.
.
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Column 2 - LRU/SRA 
A Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) is defined as any assembly which will be 
replaced in order to restore a subsystem or group of equipment to functional 
(operational) status. Fault isolation to an LRU is a Space Station goal. Automatic 
fault isolation to this level may not be economically feasible in 100 percent of the 
situations encountered. In those situations where automatic fault isolation does 
not reach the LRU level, manual intervention will be required to get from the line 
isolatable unit (LIU) level down to the LRU level. 
The automatic checkout approach also connotes that all subsystem elements 
will be designed so that operational recovery from the fault can be achieved auto-
matically through system reconfiguration, even though in some instances degraded 
operations will result. Each horizontal division on the analysis matrix identifies 
an LRU. The charts at the end of this appendix list all LRUs associated with each 
equipment group. The top line in each horizontal section of the matrix is the name 
of the LRU. The indented titles are estimates of functional blocks that could re-
present shop replaceable assemblies SRAs. The following factors were considered 
in defining the LRUs: 
• The maintenance concepts developed and defined in subtask 1-3. 
• The component level failure rates delineated in the criticality analysis 
of subtask 1-2. 
• The amount of crew time and skill required for fault isolation and repair. 
• Resultant DMS hardware and software complexity. 
• Subsystem weight, volume, location, and interchangeability 
characteristics. 
The SRA is defined as that element of an LRU that will be replaced at the 
Maintenance Facility by a remove-and-replace action to restore LRU serviceability. 
Test equipment will be required to isolate the fault from the LRU level down to the 
SRA level. In some instances it may be desirable to continue the fault isolation in 
place before LRU removal. In this instance the SRA to be replaced would already 
be identified when the LRU comes into the Maintenance Facility.
. 
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Column 3 - Quantity in System 
The numbers in Column 3 that refer to the LRU indicate the quantity in the 
application being considered, the quantity of operating or stand-by redundant spares, 
the quantity of laid-in spares, and the total usage of the LRU on board the Space 
Station. 
The number should be a coarse indication of system reconfigurability and 
multiple usage of replaceable assemblies. In instances where a single LRU is 
indicated, a potential system availability problem exists, especially if that LRU 
cannot be configured out of the system without serious degradation to the operation 
of the spacecraft or experiments. A single LRU indicates the loss of a function 
during the time period for removal, replacement, and verification. 
The quantities in Column 3 that relate to the SRAs indicate the replications 
of logical functions within the LRU. In instances where several books comprise 
one LRU, it is likely that these will be mechanically interlocked and all removed 
and replaced simultaneously. 
Column 4 - Number of Books 
This column presents a preliminary estimate of the number of standard books 
required to package the LRU/SRA functions. Functions that require less than one 
book should be grouped so that the software reconfiguration to overcome a fault 
situation is minimized. 
Column 5 - MTBF 
A mean-time-between-failure figure was estimated for each LRU. The LRU 
MTBF is essential because this is the replacement level for recovery of full opera-
tional capability. The MTBF figures will be used to determine the expected num-
ber of unscheduled maintenance actions during a resupply period. The figures are 
particularly beneficial because they form the justification for maintenance techniques 
and the capability of the Maintenance Facility. These figures, along with the 
mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) and Calibration estimates, provide a good measure 
of the expected involvement of astronauts in maintenance tasks. The MTTR figures 
also determine, to a large extent, the expected availability of the electronic 
subsystems.
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Column 6 - Critical Down Time Limit 
This column is included to help indicate the need for the wired-in spares or 
redundant equipment. It is also a basis for determining the speed and methods 
required for software reconfiguration. If a storage element, for example, has a 
critical down time limit of only a few minutes, it would be essential to store the 
data in two portions of the memory system so that the software could immediately 
recover critical data, reassign the program to an alternate storage element and 
proceed. 
Loss of some portions of the equipment, such as the dedicated memory, 
might result in a degraded operation that was safe for only a short period of time. 
It also might result in a lessening of the capability of the MDS to continue the 
periodic self-check procedures. The physical recovery to operational status might 
be best achieved by pulling the entire memory element along with the decoder and 
interface logic and replacing them with spare units. This may be necessary even 
though a "wired-in" spare or redundant equipment is immediately switched into 
the system. The critical down time limit number normally indicates recovery 
time for operational software reconfiguration or for bringing a redundant or wired 
spare on line. 
Column 7 - Software Reconfigurable 
One requirement in the definition of an LRU is that it must be reconfigurable 
under control of the DMS; otherwise, the system could not gracefully recover 
from a fault at the LRU level. However, there are several modes of software 
reconfigurations. These include: switching in of a redundant path, bringing a 
wired spare on-line, or substituting another on-line unit to perform the function 
of the failed LRU. 
Three types of reconfiguration have been identified: fail safe, fail soft, and 
system reconfiguration. Fail safe reconfiguration can be achieved by having an 
on-line redundant unit that may be immediately switched in and that will allow the 
normal software operation to continue with minimal interruption. The fail soft 
reconfiguration may take several forms. One form is a second-level fail safe 
approach which would allow time for powering up a wired-in spare. Once the 
wired-in spare is brought on-line, the system can continue operation without any 
degradation. An example of another form of fail soft reconfiguration is the substi-
tution of unused or less critical portions of the main or auxiliary memory for a 
failed portion. This approach presupposes that critical data is periodically stored 
in more than one section of the main or auxiliary memory. The amount of redundant 
data stored depends upon the time allowable for recovery. For example, certain 
critical guidance and navigation information or critical experiment information 
may be stored periodically in two sections of memory. Reconfiguration is achieved 
by falling back to the last time interval at which adequate information is available 
in the alternate memory. 
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Column 8 - Fault Isolation Scheme (On-Line 
Column 9 - Manual Fault Isolation Requirements (On-Line) 
This column summarizes the astronaut activity that would be required to 
supplement the automatic DMS software operations. The information in this 
column is limited to manual intervention to supplement fault isolation to the LRU 
level while the equipment is on-line. The goal of the DMS, of course, is to have 
no manual fault isolation requirements; however, some instances may occur where 
the astronaut must enter supplementary data or use display data to make judgments 
as to the DMS software programs that should be exercised to isolate a fault. The 
information in this column will also assist in determining whether adequate re-
configuration capability is being designed into the system and whether the astronaut 
intervention is consistent with the critical down time limits. 
Column 10 - Operational Recovery Scheme 
Information in this column indicates the means for maintaining subsystem 
operation while the faulty unit is still in place. Certain types of failures may 
preclude continued operation of the subsystem with the faulty unit in place. The 
objective would be to design LRU interface circuits such that no fault within an 
LRU can affect the operation of any other LRU. There are certain limitations to 
this objective, such as shorts between connector pins and limitations involving 
components that immediately interface the power bus or components of other LRUs. 
One requirement for the design of LRUs should be that each LRU will have 
its own power control. The Power Distribution System must be designed so that 
any LRU may be switched on or off without affecting the operation of any other 
LRU. LRU interface circuits should also be designed so that a redundant or wired-
in LRU may be removed without affecting system operation. 
Column 11 - Mean-Time-to-Repair (Hours) 
The mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) figures are estimates of the time to 
restore the system to operational status after the DMS has isolated the fault to 
the Line Isolatable level. The MTTR figure will be estimated on the basis of 
repair times for similar equipment in ground installations and then converted to 
the zero-g space environment by application of the "derating" factors found in 
Table A-i. (This table was extracted from Section 10 of reference ii where it 
was designed as Table 10-8). Time required to fetch a spare LRU from storage 
will also be included in the MTTR.
.
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Table A-i. Maintenance Derating or "K" Factors for Maintainability Predictions 
Derived from Zero-G Demonstrations 
A. From One- g to Zero-g in Shirtsleeves and Foot Restraints 
For EVA Black Boxes: K = 138 Seconds (Zero-g in S.S.)
=  133 Seconds (One-g in S.S.)	 1.0376
1099.2 Seconds (Zero-g in S.S.)
 
For IVA Modules: K = 878 Seconds (One-g in S. S.)
	
= 1.2519
 
B. From Zero-g in Shirtsleeves and Foot Restraints to Zero-g in Pressure 
Suit with No Foot Restraints 
For EVA Black Boxes: K = 237.6 Seconds (Zero-g P.S. = 1.732 
 138 Seconds (Zero-g S.S.) 
For WA Modules: K 2648.4 Seconds (Zero-g P. S. -2.4685 1099.2 Seconds (Zero-gS.S.) 
C. From One-g Shirtsleeves to Zero-g Pressure Suit Without Foot 
Restraints 
For EVA Black Boxes: K = .237.6 Seconds (Zero-g P.S. = 1.7865 133 Seconds (One-g.S.S.) 	 .
F For WA Modules: K = 2648.4 Seconds (Zero-g P.S.) -3.0164
 878 Seconds (One-g S.S.) 
Column 12 - Self-Test or Stimuli Requirements 
Information in this column summarizes built-in or external equipment that is 
essential to the location of LRU level faults. Information in parentheses indicates 
external equipment. All other information indicates equipment that is built into 
the element. An external stimulus generator has been specified for use with the 
Data Acquisition units. It is wired to Data Acquisition equipment and is controlled 
by the DMS. 
Column 13 - Mechanical Adjustments 
This column is an estimate of the time required for periodic mechanical 
adjustments to maintain reliable operation. Mechanical adjustment may be needed 
for any electromechanical device that is subject to wear or change in setting after 
repeated operations. The adjustments will be performed on a periodic basis as 
part of the preventive maintenance procedures.
. 
S 
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Column 14 - Calibration Requirements 
Information in these columns is an estimate of the expected calibration time 
•	 for analog and electromechanical components. They offer a measure of the 
astronaut involvement in preventive maintenance and set up procedures. They also 
indicate the need for design approaches that will minimize both mechanical adjust-
ments and calibration requirements. Magnetic disc and tape units are prime 
examples. 
The sum of Columns 12 and 13 identifies minimum astronaut involvement in 
preventive maintenance and calibration procedures. They may help to justify the 
need for lower levels of DMS fault isolation software that will minimize astronaut 
involvement. 
Column 15 - Margin Check Requirements 
The purpose of this column is to identify those LRUs or SRAs that might 
require periodic variation of electrical or mechanical parameters in order to 
determine amount of degradation. An indication of the level of degradation is also 
an indication of remaining useful life. This information may be applicable for 
planning adjustment and calibration schedules, and it may be of value to the 
logistics planning procedure because it is a prediction of time to failure. 
The value of knowing the degree to which a device has degraded must be 
equated to its cost in terms of power, weight, and volume of equipment and the 
astronaut time required to perform the check. 
Column 16 - Hazards 
Information in this column should indicate the hazards involved in replace-
ment of LRU or in performing fault isolation or repair at the SRA level. The 
hazards identified will help to define the safe handling and repair levels for all 
types of assemblies. Another result of identifying hazards should be the definition 
of design requirements that would minimize accidents and reduce the complexity 
of maintenance procedures. 
Items to be considered in this column include: Contamination of the environ-
ment, high voltage, exposure to rotating equipment, handling of equipment having 
large weight or volume, exposure to extreme temperatures, and unusual physical 
effects on the astronaut. The latter item could include strains due to poor light, 
poor access, or unusually complex procedures. 
.
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APPENDIX B

ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA CHARTS 
.
.
B-i
Data Bus Terminal X 
Digital Buffer and Control X 
Record/Reproduce 
Electronics Assembly X 
Transport Switch Matrix X 
Controller Switch Matrix X 
Tape Transports 
Tape Transport 
Controllers x 
Bulk Data Storage 
Power Supply X 
Totals 7
X 
El
	
1
	
8
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA 
SUBSYSTEM Data Management
GROUP 
LRU
Fault 
Isolate to 
LRU 
R&R
Fault 
Isolate to 
LIU Manual 
Fl to LRU 
then R&R
FT Manually 
Initiated and 
Monitored 
R&R the LRU
Number 
of 
LRU's 
COMPUTER GROUP 
Data Bus Controller X 
Data Bus Switch Matrix X 
Memory Switch Matrix X 
Data Bus I/o X 
Shared Memory I/o X 
CPU Logic and Control X 
Dedicated Memory X 
CPU Power Eupply x 
Shared Memory 
Electronics Section X 
Shared Memory 
Mechanical Assembly x 
Memory Elements X 
Shared Memory 
Power Supply X 
Totals 7 4 1 12 
El 
. 
BULK DATA STORAGE
A 
B-2 
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA (Continued) 
SUBSYSTEM Data Management
Fault Fault Fl Manually Number 
GROUP Isolate to Isolate to Initiated and of 
LRU LRU LIU Manual Monitored LRU's 
R&R Fl to LRU R&R the LRU 
then R&R 
DATA ACQUISITION 
Data Bus Terminal X 
RDAU (or LMDU) X 
Stimuli Generation Unit X 
Totals 3 0 0 3 
COMMAND/CONTROLS AND 
DISPLAY 
Data Bus Terminal x 
Display Control & Buffer X 
Display Switch Matrix X 
.	 Refresh Buffer X 
Display Control X 
CRT Display Assembly x 
Warning Annunciator 
Assembly X 
Caution Display Assembly x 
Alpha-Numeric Display 
Assembly x 
Status Light Assembly x 
Dedicated Displays x 
Command Buffer & Control X 
Digital Multiplexer X 
Hand Controller Assembly x 
Computer Keyboard 
Assembly x 
Mode Select Switch 
Assembly x 
Multifunction Switch 
Assembly x
.
B-3 
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA (Continued) 
SUBSYSTEM Data Management
	 IJ 
Fault	 Fault	 Fl Manually Number 
GROUP	 Isolate to Isolate to
	 Initiated and of 
LRU	 LRU	 LIU Manual Monitored
	 LRU's 
R&R	 FItoLRU R&R the LRU 
then R&R
COMMAND/CONTROLS AND 
DISPLAYS (Continued) 
Mono- Function Switch 
Assembly x 
Discrete Controls x 
Microfilm Viewer 
Assembly x 
Microfilm Viewer Control 
and File X 
Analog Interface Unit x 
Channel Select & Analog 
Control 
CCTV Panel Assembly x 
Intercom Control Panel 
Assembly x 
Audio Tape Assembly X 
Video Tape Assembly x 
Illumination Control 
Assembly x 
CCDC Power Supplies x 
Totals	 7	 0 22	 29 
PORTABLE DISPLAY AND 
CONTROLS 
Data Bus Terminal
	 X 
Display Assembly x 
Computer Keyboard 
Assembly X 
Optional Pluggable 
Functions x 
Power Supply x 
Totals	 1	 0 4	 5
S 
B-4 
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA (Continued) 
SUBSYSTEM Data Management
Fault Fault H Manually Number 
GROUP Isolate to Isolate to Initiated and of 
LRU LRU LIU Manual Monitored LRU's 
R&R Fl to LRU R&R the LRU 
then R&R 
GN&C PREPROCESSOR 
Data Bus Terminal X 
GN&C Preprocessor x 
Totals 2 0 0 2 
ATTITUDE REFERENCE 
Gyro X 
Gyro Electronics x 
Gyro Power Supply x 
Horizon Sensor (4 Hds) X 
•	 Horizon Detector 
Star Sensor (2 HcIs) X 
Star Tracker x 
Star Tracker Electronics X 
Sensor Alignment 
Monitor Transmitter x 
Sensor Alignment 
Monitor Receiver x 
Experiment Target 
Alignment Transmitter x 
Experiment Target 
Sensor System X 
Experiment Prism 
Alignment Transmitter x 
Experiment Light 
Deflecting Platforms x 
Totals 7 1 6 14
.
B-5 
NAVIGATION 
Low-G Accelerometer X 
Low-G Accelerometer 
Electronics X 
Landmark Tracker X 
Landmark Tracker 
Electronics x 
Inertial Sensor Buffer X 
Horizon Sensor Buffer X 
Stellar Sensor Buffer X 
Landmark Alignment 
Buffer X 
Laser Tracker Buffer x 
CMG Control Buffer X 
Reaction Jet Control 
Buffer X 
Data Control Buffer X 
Totals 12 
RENDEZVOUS AND TRACIUNG 
Laser Docking Tracker X 
Laser Docking Tracker 
Electronics x 
Laser Rendezvous Tracker X 
Laser Rendezvous Tracker 
Electronics X 
Totals 4
0	 0	 12 
0	 0	 4
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA (Continued) 
SUBSYSTEM Guidance, 
Navigation &
	
Fault	 Fault	 Fl Manually Number 
Control	 Isolate to Isolate to
	 Initiated and of 
GROUP	 LRU	 LIU Manual Monitored
	 LRU's 
LRU	 R&R	 Fl to LRU R&R the LRU 
then R&R 
fl 
B-6 
ONLINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA (Continued) 
SUBSYSTEM Guidance, 
Navigation & Fault Fault Fl Manually Number 
Control Isolate to Isolate to Initiated and of 
GROUP LRU LIU Manual Monitored LRU's 
LRU R&R Fl to LRU R&R the LRU 
then R&R 
CONTROL 
Reaction Jet Thrust 
Driver X 
Resis-to-Jet Control 
Module X 
Backup Control Modules x 
Backup Control 
Electronics x 
CMG Rotor/Gimbal X 
CMG Torquer (Inner) X 
CMG Torquer (Outer) x 
Retor Control Electronics X 
Torquer Control 
Electronics x 
Totals 9 0 0 9
TOTALS	 32	 1	 6	 39 
[1
B-7 
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA (Continued) 
Preliminary Data w/o Benefit of Task 2 S 
SUBSYSTEM R. F. 
Communications Fault Fault Fl Manually	 Number 
Isolate to Isolate to Initiated and	 of 
GROUP LRU LIU Manual Monitored	 LRU's 
LRU R&R Fl to LRU R&R the LRU 
then R&R 
FFM
S-Band Video Receiver X 
Video Receiver Modem X 
S-Band Data Receiver X 
DRSS
S-Band PM Receiver X 
Ku-Band FM Exciter X 
FM Xmtr Modem X 
S-Band FM Receiver X 
Receiver Modem X
FFM-DRSS COMMON 
Ku-Band PA	 x 
Ku-Band PM Exciter	 X 
GROUND DIRECT 
S-Band PM Transponder	 X 
Transponder Modem
	 X 
S-Band Power Amp
	 X 
S-Band FM Exciter	 X 
Transmitter Modem
	 X
is 
B-8
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA (Continued) 
Preliminary Data W/O Benefit of Task 2 
SUBSYSTEM R. F. 
Communications	 Fault	 Fault	 Fl Manually Number 
Isolate to Isolate to
	 Initiated and of 
GROUP	 LRU	 LIU Manual Monitored
	 LRU's 
LRU	 R&R	 Fl to LRU R&R the LRU 
then R&R 
SHUTTLE 
VHF Voice Ranging T/R
	
X 
Ranging Modem
	 X 
Voice Modem	 x 
VHF Data T/R
	 S 
EVA
VHF - FMT/R X 
Modern X 
Totals 21 0	 0	 21 
LOW-GAIN ANTENNA GROUP 
VHF Antennas x 
VHF Diplexers x 
VHF Multiplexer, Power 
Dividers & Switches 
S-Band Antennas x 
S-Band Triplexer and 
Switches x 
Ku-Band Antennas x 
Ku Band Prearnp/Mixer/ 
Diplexer/Switches X 
S-Band Multiplexer and 
Circulator x 
Ku-Band Waveguides x 
VHF/S-Band Coaxial 
Cables x 
Totals 3 7	 0
B-9 
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA (Continued) 
Preliminary Data W/O Benefit of Task 2
	
P4 
SUBSYSTEM R. F. 
Communications 
GROUP 
LRU 
HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA GROUP 
Main Reflector/Feed 
Acq. Reflector/Feed 
Pseudo Monopulse 
Comp/Mod. 
Positioner 
Drive Motors 
Drive System 
Electronics 
K -Bánd TDA/Mixer/ 
L. 0. 
RF Switches (External) 
RF Switches (Internal) 
Ku-Band Quadriplexers 
and Circulators 
Ku-Band Diplexer 
S-Band Quadriplexers and 
Power Divider 
S-Band Diplexer 
Ku- Band Waveguides 
S-Band Coaxial Cable 
Totals 
B-b
Fault	 Fault	 Fl Manually Number 
Isolate to Isolate to
	 Initiated and of 
LRU	 LIU Manual Monitored	 LRU's 
R&R	 Fl to LRU R&R then LRU 
then R&R 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
3	 12	 15
.
ON LINE MAINTENANCE TRADE DATA SUMMARY 
Subsystem 
Group
•No. of 
LRU's 
Considered
LRU's Requiring 
Manual Initiation 
or Assistance to 
Fault Isolate
Percent of 
LRU's Requiring 
Manual Assistance 
Data Management 
Computer 12 5 42 
Bulk Data Storage 8 1 12 
Data Acquisition 3 0 0 
Command/Control 29 22 76 
and Display 
Portable Display 5 4 80 
GN&C Preprocessor 2 0 0 
Total 59 32 54 
GN&C
Attitude Reference 
Navigation 
Rendezvous & Tracking 
Control 
Total 
RFCS
T /R/Modem 
Low-Gain Antenna 
High-Gain Antenna 
Total 
14 7 50 
12 0 0 
4 0 0 
--
39 7 18 
21 0 0 
10 7 70 
15 12 80 
46 19 41
GRAND TOTAL
	 144	 58	 40
B-11/B-12 
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